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RUEHKS0/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 5967  
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RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC  
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR  
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001676

SIPDIS

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [JA](#) [MNUC](#) [PREL](#)

SUBJECT: MOVING FROM 3 TO 2 NUCLEAR PRINCIPLES IN JAPAN

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., James P. Zumwalt, per 1.4 (b/d)

11. (C) Summary: The recent disclosure of a "secret" agreement between the United States and Japan dating from the 1960s has caused a media and political stir on the continued relevance of Japan's "Three Non-nuclear Principles." Former Vice Foreign Minister Ryohei Murata, who served as VFM from 1987-89, disclosed to the press the existence of the agreement between the U.S. and Japan (declassified in the U.S. in 1999 and available on the internet), that allowed nuclear-armed U.S. vessels and aircraft into Japan. His stated purpose in doing so was to force a public debate on the issue. He believes such a debate over Japan's three non-nuclear principles of not "producing, possessing or introducing" nuclear weapons into Japan will result in Japan explicitly allowing U.S. nuclear weapons into Japan, thereby strengthening the nuclear umbrella and having a greater deterrent effect on North Korea and China. Although the Japanese government still denies the existence of the agreement, opposition DPJ President Yukio Hatoyama has vowed to discuss the issue with the United States if the DPJ wins the upcoming general election. DPJ Secretary General Katsuya Okada told the press on July 23 that if the DPJ takes power, the Foreign Minister would order MOFA bureaucrats to disclose the documents. End Summary.

12. (C) In June, former Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Ryohei Murata spoke on the record to Japanese media affirming the existence of a formerly secret agreement between the U.S. and Japan giving tacit approval for the stopover of U.S. military aircraft or vessels carrying nuclear weapons. The disclosure continues to make headlines, primarily because the Japanese government continues to officially deny that the agreement existed. While Prime Minister Taro Aso, Chief Cabinet Secretary Takeo Kawamura and Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone have stated that "there is no such pact," House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Taro Kono of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has gone so far as to say that he will not allow the government to deny the secret deal, and in mid-July intimated that the Foreign Affairs Committee might officially question Murata. Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) President Yukio Hatoyama told the press that the DPJ intends to discuss the issue with the U.S. if his party wins the upcoming general election, and DPJ Secretary General Katsuya Okada said on July 23 that if the DPJ takes

power, the Foreign Minister would order MOFA bureaucrats to disclose any documents relating to the agreement. In Japan, where the tradition of "the less said the better" is deeply embedded both in the culture and language, the question remains--why would Murata agree to go on the record regarding the accord? A media analyst contact with direct knowledge of Murata's motivations for disclosing the agreement in Japan said privately that Murata has two main reasons for going on the record.

¶3. (C) First, Murata wants to strengthen the nuclear umbrella by forcing the GOJ to explicitly and publicly allow the "introduction" of nuclear weapons to Japan. Murata hopes to change Japan's three non-nuclear principles of not "possessing, producing or introducing" nuclear weapons to two nuclear principles (nonpossession and nonproduction) by forcing a public debate that will result in the "nonintroduction" principle being dropped.

¶4. (C) Second, Murata believes Japan is threatened increasingly by both North Korea and China. He feels that a Japan that has gone on the record as allowing U.S. nuclear forces into or through Japanese territory would be better able to counter that threat.

¶5. (C) Murata has been successful in the sense that he has indeed sparked a vigorous debate among policymakers about the role of extended deterrence in Japan. Even the DPJ's Hatoyama has stated publicly that discussions need to be held on "America's extended deterrence and the threat from North

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Korea."

¶6. (C) Up until recently, the debate over the agreement has been conducted solely among the Japanese and has focused on whether or not the Japanese government is candid with the Japanese people about arrangements under the security treaty.

However, Japanese journalists are increasingly asking U.S. officials about this matter. Embassy recommends that if asked about the documents, U.S. officials should say that declassified USG documents speak for themselves and we have no further comment.

ZUMWALT